Jangai Jap: The Struggle against Myanmar's Junta

In the spirit of Frantz Fanon or Gloria Richardson, I had a fascinating discussion with scholar Jangai Jap on the armed struggle against Myanmar’s military junta. Read our conversation below!

Asia Art Tours: Could you discuss how your research and fieldwork in Myanmar has changed and become more nuanced over time regarding issues of diversity?

Jangai Jap: When thinking about the issues of diversity in Myanmar, we tend to think about ethnic diversity and ethnic politics. Myanmar is of course incredibly diverse in terms of ethnicity and languages. What strikes me though is the diversity within each ethnic community (Bamar and minority groups). There is urban/rural divide, those who live in the areas controlled by the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) versus those who live in the areas controlled by the government, variation in socio-economic class and level of education, and so on. These within-group variations mean that there is no coherent ethnic minority experience or Bamar experience. For example, ethnic minorities’ grievances include discrimination, but I have noticed that ethnic minorities from the top tier of socio-economic class tend to not experience discrimination (keep in mind that in Myanmar ethnicity is not visually distinguishable) whereas those in the lower tiers do. So, the “ethnic minority experience” of those from the lower tiers hardly resonates with those in the top tier.

In a similar vein, regarding the issue of self-determination, there are radical as well as moderate voices within each ethnic minority communities. In sum, various groups within a single ethnic minority community have different and sometimes competing interests. Thus, it is very important that analysts, journalist, and scholars alike are cognizant of the segment of ethnic minority community they are encountering with.

Relatedly, ethnic minority communities are not unitary actors. This means that Kachin community does not have a single voice or a single point of view. The same can be said about other communities. As such the challenge for those of us trying to understand Myanmar is to identify and explain within-group diversity in Myanmar.

There is urban/rural divide, those who live in the areas controlled by the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) versus those who live in the areas controlled by the government, variation in socio-economic class and level of education, and so on. These within-group variations mean that there is no coherent ethnic minority experience or Bamar experience.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with Aung San Suu Kyi and her staff at her home in Yangon, 2012. Photo Credit: Public Domain.

Asia Art Tours: In your fieldwork, what reflections did Kachin community members have on this period of ‘ceasefire capitalism’? And how did greater integration into regional and global capitalism change the political economy of what Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)were fighting for?

Jangai Jap:I am going to first state a disclaimer that I have not rigorously studied “ceasefire capitalism.” So, I have not talked to Kachin community members on this matter. I will just share what I have noticed, and this of course will not be comprehensive. First, EAOs and individual leaders of the EAOs are just a few beneficiaries of the ceasefire capitalism. There were individuals who were not associated with the EAOs but were involved in the ceasefire negotiation; they also received lucrative business deals. These are some of the wealthiest individuals/families in the ethnic minority communities. Another thing to note is that the period of ceasefire capitalism coincided with the rise of local NGOs in Myanmar. This is not to say that local NGOs are products of ceasefire capitalism. That would be absolutely false! But the local NGOs, particularly the ones involved in the peace process, are sustained, and enriched to a certain extent, due to the politics of ceasefire and peace process. And my sense is that many Kachins at the grassroots level are quite weary of the local NGOs. The local NGOs are sometimes seen as capitalizing on one’s community and social woes for individual enrichment.

That said, what’s been interesting is how Kachin public’s view of the EAO (KIO, [Kachin Independence Organization] in this case) has changed over the past decade. Generally speaking, the Kachin public held unfavorable views of the KIO during the period of “ceasefire capitalism.” However, since war resumed in the Kachin area in 2011, the Jinghpaw speaking Kachin public increasingly express favorable views and support for the KIO. Other segments of the Kachin community by and large remain critical. Furthermore, since the coup, even some from the non-Jingphaw speaking Kachin public (particularly young people) appear to voice favorable views of the KIO. Time of crisis seem to have a unifying effect on the Kachin community. It will be quite interesting to examine reasons underlying the shifts in public opinion.

Regarding KIO’s governance, it is important to note that they provide quite extensive public and social services in the areas they controlled. I would like to highlight schools in particular. These schools tend to be free (unless if the student need to board). Given the on-going political crisis in Myanmar, many parents do not want to send their children to government schools. So, students who attended the government schools in the previous years are now attending schools in the areas controlled by the KIO. Schooling will likely affect how these students (and perhaps also their family) view the KIO.

The local NGOs, particularly the ones involved in the peace process, are sustained, and enriched to a certain extent, due to the politics of ceasefire and peace process. And my sense is that many Kachins at the grassroots level are quite weary of the local NGOs. The local NGOs are sometimes seen as capitalizing on one’s community and social woes for individual enrichment.

Cadets of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) preparing for military drills at the group’s headquarters in Laiza, Kachin State. Photo Credit: Paul Vrieze, Voice of America (Public Domain)

Asia Art Tours: If EAOs begin to support the CDM struggle, how do you expect the tactics of the CDM movement to change? And will the CDM protests allow space for both the NLD and those who want to move beyond it?

Jangai Jap: We are in the fifth month since the coup on February 1. In the first 3 months of so, the main tactics of resistance against the new junta, also known as the Security and Administration Council (SAC)were (1) protests, (2) social punishment (colloquially known as SP), and (3) civil disobedience movement (CDM). However, resistance tactics have evolved since then. By the fourth month, situation in Myanmar became increasingly violent. The SAC’s security forces were violent from the beginning, but they became increasingly ruthless, and as such, armed resistance against the SAC also began to emerge across the country (I will get to this in the next paragraph). So, while the protests were still happening, they are less frequent, smaller and more or less guerilla in nature—a small group of protesters would gather for a few minutes and disperse before the security forces arrive on the scene. The CDM is on-going, but it is important to note that to be or not to be a CDMer is an incredibly difficult choice. Those who participate in the CDM are threatened by the SAC security forces. Many get arrested and killed. So, it is possible that some people do not participate in the CDM due to fear of retribution from the SAC. At the same time, those who do not participate in the CDM also face security concerns; many such individuals are accused and labeled as “dalan” (SAC’s information and/or collaborator) and attacked and killed by unidentified attackers. We do not know if the unidentified attackers are SAC security forces or anti-SAC civilians.

This brings me to my next point about how the resistance tactics have evolved in the last couple of months. Civilians in several townships (including those in Chin and Kayah States, Magway, Mandalay and Sagaing Regions) have taken up arms to defend themselves and their villages/towns against the SAC security forces. Armed resistance consists of loosely formed local militias that began organically and informally, but by early May, these groups began to establish themselves as the People’s Defence Force (PDF). Some of the earliest clashes between the PDF and the SAC’s troops occurred in Chin State in the first few weeks of May. Then such encounters began appearing in other parts of the country as well. There are reports that many civilians involved in the armed resistance movement traveled to the EAO-controlled areas to receive armed training.

While the protests were still happening, they are less frequent, smaller and more or less guerilla in nature—a small group of protesters would gather for a few minutes and disperse before the security forces arrive on the scene. The CDM is on-going, but it is important to note that to be or not to be a CDMer is an incredibly difficult choice.

Residents of Kyaukse District protesting against the Coup of the Tatmadaw Military Junta over Myanmar’s democratically elected NLD party. Photo Credit: Taung Tan, CC 4.0

Now turning to the role of EAOs in the SAC-resistance effort: my understanding is that many EAOs do support the CDM struggle and other resistant tactics against the SAC. The immediate weeks following the coup, most EAOs did not clearly voice their stance, but there were already reports that the KNU and DKBA troops were protecting the protesters who were increasingly being targeted with violence from the government troops. The KIO also released a statement indicating that they will take action should violence against civilians in the Kachin area increase. In the recent months, it became apparent that many striking civil servants (CDMers) as well as journalists, protesters, celebrities and other civilians who are charged with the section 505A have been taking refuge in the EAO areas. I believe that some NLD members are also taking refugee there. As mentioned above, there are also reports that many young people who are resisting the SAC in the urban areas travelled to the EAO areas for armed training; these young people returned to the government-controlled areas to continue resistance against the SAC. My point is not that the PDFs emerged with the help of EAOs. They seemed to have emerged organically in their localities. My point though is that several individuals in the PDFs or leading the PDFs recently received training from the EAOs. These developments would suggest that some EAOs do support the CDM and the broader resistance movement against the SAC.

In tandem with the increase in-flow of refugees, displaced persons and other individuals into the EAOs areas, there has also been an increased in fighting between the Tatmadaw and certain EAOs. The KIA in particular have conducted a number of offensive operations; these diverge from their past actions in that the past operations were mostly defensive. Last week, there were reports that some KIA troops helped the PDF against the SAC troops in northern Sagaing Region. These are all significant actions taken against the SAC.

What’s interesting is that the public opinion on the EAOs seem to have changed in the recent months. I don’t think that the Myanmar public ever had favorable attitudes toward the EAOs, but they (including Bamar) are now writing well wishes to various EAOs. These developments indicate that participating in the CDM, supporting the CDM or resisting the SAC in any way is not the same as supporting the NLD. You can be critical of the NLD and resist the SAC. These are not mutually exclusive. What’s happening in Myanmar now is so much bigger than NLD versus the military. And the NLD seems to be just one piece in the collective movement against the SAC.

That said, an additional comment I’d like to make regarding the NLD-ethnic minority relationship is this: political preferences are context driven— they are not fixed. Those who were critical of NLD before the coup may now work with NLD members/supporters because such collaboration is more advantageous compared to the alternatives. In a similar vein, those who voted for NLD may now be quiescent (not protest against the coup) because they have more to gain doing so compared to the alternatives. We are not going to understand how individuals and groups make their calculations and arrive at their respective conclusions on how to behave, who to ally with, or what to do in general, but I think that people do behave strategically. And their strategy will be driven by their shifting preferences.

What’s happening in Myanmar now is so much bigger than NLD versus the military. And the NLD seems to be just one piece in the collective movement against the SAC.

A Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) medic treating refugees in Kayin State. Photo Credit: Steve Sandford, VOA (Public Domain)

Asia Art Tours: And for people who want to support Myanmar’s protesters or those reading about Myanmar for the first time, what caution, advice or guidelines would you offer? What about this conflict is a simple binary and what requires a more careful perspective?

Jangai Jap: Please support the people of Myanmar. Myanmar is currently engulfed in political as well as humanitarian crises. These are several types of individuals who are suffering and in need of help due to coup (which is then compounded by the new wave of Covid-19 outbreak). Protesters and CDMers need our help. People who are displaced due to armed clashes in their area, families living in conflict areas, and family members of political prisoners also need our help. So, my advice would be to get in touch with a trusted organization and ask how/who you should help.

Yangon Protesters flash the ‘3 fingers’ gesture at an anti-junta protest. Photo Credit: Public Domain

For more of Jangai’s incredible research, check out: Jangaijap.com

Jangai Jap: The Struggle against Myanmar’s Junta

What’s happening in Myanmar now is so much bigger than NLD versus the military. And the NLD seems to be just one piece in the collective movement against the SAC.

Author Matt Dagher-margosian